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Abstract: Recently scholars have been calling for the loosening up of China’s 
one-child policy, and even the Chinese government has begun to show some 
willingness to do so. The call is not new. In my doctoral dissertation 25 years ago 
I first showed that China should allow couples to have two children and could 
still achieve the same population control goal as the one-child policy. I am glad to 
see that what I proposed 25 years ago is repeated by many scholars and even 
acceptable to the Chinese government. 
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A quarter of a century ago in 1988, China’s one-child policy was in 
full swing and some side-effects had begun to show. Concerned about 
it, I wrote my doctoral dissertation examining this policy under the 
guidance of late Professors AnsleyCoale and Norman Ryder at 
Princeton, both finding fathers of demography as a scientific study.1  I 
was among the first to point out themajor flaws of the policy, and my 
view then was regarded as quite heretic: I proposed an alternative two-
child policy that could achieve the same population control goal as the 
one-child policy. Needless to say, the Chinese government did not listen 
to me, and many of the social problems associated with the policy we 
worried then have become full-grown bitter fruits in China by now, 
which has triggered a hot debate among China scholars on whether 
China should keep or abandon the (infamous) one-child policy. 
Twenty five years later, my research interests have wandered from 
demography to international political economy. But amid the debate, I 
found that the findings and policy recommendations in my dissertation 
is still relevant and worth to be re-capped. 
First, I found that there is no empirical evidence that links 
population size or growth with poverty. The very assumption of the 
one-child policy, namely, that high birth rate will lead to lower 
economic growth, is not true. In fact China’s own experience does not 
support such claim. From 1950 to 1979, the average number of children 
                                                 
1 Shaomin Li, 1988, China’s Population Policy: A Model of a Constant Stream 
of Births. Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton University.Shaomin Li, 1989, 
"China's population policy: a model of a constant stream of births."  
Population Research and Policy Review, 8, 279-300.Shaomin Li, 1989, 
“China’s population control and socio-economic reforms: The Chinese 
dilemma.” China Report, 25(3), 219-235. 
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per woman in China experienced one of the most drastic reductions in 
human history: from 5.8 to 2.7 per woman. However, this rapid decline 
in birth rate did not help the Chinese economy to grow at all; under 
Mao’s communist economic policy, by the late 1970s, the Chinese 
economy was on the verge of a total collapse.  The real economic 
growth took place after Mao’s death and China started the economic 
reform. For example, from 1979 to 2007, the Chinese economy grew 
about 10% annually, or 1512% overall, while average number of child 
per woman only declined a mere 1% per year, or 37% overall.  Rapid 
population growth may make a poor country poorer by increasing the 
dependency ratio temporarily, but population growth itself is not the 
root cause of poor economic performance.  The root cause of China’s 
poverty under Mao is the centrally-controlled economic policy that 
stifles productivity growth and innovation.  The major driver of 
China’s economic miracle is the creativity and individual initiative of 
the vast labor force released by the economic reform.  
Second, realizing it is highly unlikely to persuade an authoritarian 
government such as China’s to relinquish its grip on individual’s right 
to have children, I then explored a more politically feasible and 
potentially humane birth control policy that allows more individual 
freedom while maintaining the numerical goal of the government’s 
birth control.  Birth rate can be viewed from a period or cohort 
perspective. If we follow women in a specific age group throughout 
their lifetime and record the number of children they have, we will get a 
cohort fertility rate; alternatively, we can record the number of children 
born by women of all ages in a given time, such as a year, and obtain 
the period fertility rate. A birth control policy such as China’s is only 
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concerned with the period fertility rate, namely, how many babies are 
born per year.  However, it is the cohort fertility rate, namely, the 
number of children a woman has during her lifetime, that is the most 
important for women. Intuitively, it is easy to understand that if all 
women postpone their first birth and keep a longer interval between 
births, the period fertility rate will be lower than otherwise. I developed 
a mathematical model to explore the implications of this policy in my 
dissertation. In general, the model reveals that it is not necessary to 
reduce cohort fertility (as the current on-child policy does) in order 
to lower the period fertility rate (which is the goal of the 
government); the latter can be achieved by gradually raising the 
average age of childbearing while keeping cohort fertility at a 
higher level, such as two children per woman (The logic here is the 
same as the U.S. Social Security pension’s gradually raising the 
retirement age without reducing the pension amount). In the simulation 
I did for my dissertation, I allowed every woman to have two children 
provided that the average age of children bearing gradually rises for 
four years over a 20 year time span, the total annual births would 
remain the same as a stringent one-child policy!  In other words, the 
government can still achieve its population control goal while 
increasing the citizens’ fertility freedom by 100%! 
In hindsight, the average age of childbearing rose from 26 to 27 
from 1994 to 2006 in China, which is consistent with what my 
simulation modelprojected and with the historical trend documented by 
other newly developed countries.Thus,if the government changes its 
one-child policy to a two-child policy and encourages couples to 
slightly postpone the first birth and keep a slightly longer interval 
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between births, it will achieve the same population control goal as the 
one-child policy. The new policy is not only much more humane, but 
also corrects the upside down pyramid age structure of the Chinese 
population resulted from the one-child policy (i.e., four grandparents, 
two parents, one child), not to mention that it will also mitigate the 
social psychological issuesin asociety full of the “little emperors.” 
The socioeconomic problems caused by the one-child policy seem 
to have been foreseen by Thomas Malthus who first raised the 
overpopulation concern some two hundred years ago but cautioned 
about making a deliberate policy to correct it when he said: “prudence 
cannot be enforced by laws without a great violation of natural liberty 
and a great risk of producing more evil than good.”2 
It is time to relax the one-child policy and allow couples to have 
two children before more damage occurs from this disastrous social 
policy. 
 
                                                 
2 T. R. Malthus, “A Summary View of the Principle of Population,” in D.V. 
Glass (Ed.), Introduction to Malthus (London: Watts, 1953). 
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